We consider Location-based Service (LBS) settings, where a LBS provider logs the requests sent by mobile device users over a period of time and later wants to publish/share these logs. Log sharing can be extremely valuable for advertising, data mining research and network management, but it poses a serious threat to the privacy of LBS users. Sender anonymity solutions prevent a malicious attacker from inferring the interests of LBS users by associating them with their service requests after gaining access to the anonymized logs. With the fast-increasing adoption of smartphones and the concern that historic user trajectories are becoming more accessible, it becomes necessary for any sender anonymity solution to protect against attackers that are trajectory-aware (i.e. have access to historic user trajectories) as well as policy-aware (i.e they know the log anonymization policy). We call such attackers TP-aware. This paper introduces a first privacy guarantee against TP-aware attackers, called TP-aware sender k-anonymity. It turns out that there are many possible TP-aware anonymizations for the same LBS log, each with a different utility to the consumer of the anonymized log. The problem of finding the optimal TP-aware anonymization is investigated. We show that trajectory-awareness renders the problem computationally harder than the trajectory-unaware variants found in the literature (NP-complete in the size of the log, versus PTIME). We describe a PTIME l-approximation algorithm for trajectories of length l and empirically show that it scales to large LBS logs (up to 2 million users).
INTRODUCTION
A Location-based service (LBS) [7] is an information or entertainment service, accessible with mobile devices through the mobile network and utilizing the geographic location of the mobile device (e.g. "find the nearest gas station", "Thai restaurant", "hospital"). Recently, the availability and usage of Location-based service has increased significantly because the location of mobile devices can be computed automatically (without any input from the user) by the wireless network (via triangulation of mobile device signal) or by the mobile devices themselves (via the embedded GPS chip).
Most of the popular Location-based services such as Facebook
Places [2] , FourSquare [3] , Gowalla [5] and Loopt [6] log the LBS requests sent by their users. The data retention policies of these LBSs have provisions that describe this intent. An LBS request log is of great value to advertisers and researchers as it can be used to answer queries such as "find the requests sent by users that move from location A to location B" or "requests sent by the same user over a period of time". But an LBS request log may also contain sensitive requests that the user wishes to keep private (e.g. for the local campaign headquarter of a given political party, spiritual center for a given religion, etc.). In the event that an attacker gains access to the LBS request log, the sender's privacy is at risk. In this paper we investigate how to anonymize the LBS request log so as to protect the identity of the LBS request senders even if the log falls in the hands of attackers who also gain access to a) the sequence of location-timestamp pairs (a.k.a. trajectory) visited by the mobile users for the duration the LBS requests are logged and b) the anonymization policy used to provide this protection. Assumption b) is based on a well-accepted principle of designing a private and secure system -"The design is not a secret" [27] . Assumption a) is a realization of the fact that an attacker can obtain the locations visited by the users from many sources, including the wireless service provider, or location computing servers such as SkyHook [8] , or user surveillance. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal [9] and a joint study [17] by Intel Labs, Penn State, and Duke University provide evidence that advertisers are logging the trajectories of the mobile device users. The attacker may gain access to this information via hacking, financial agreement and subpoena.
In the LBS context, the best-studied identity protection measure is known as sender k-anonymity [20, 19, 24, 20, 16] , which is intended to guarantee that the content of an LBS request and the precise location of the users are insufficient to distinguish among the actual sender and k-1 other possible senders. This guarantee is targeted towards the LBS request sent by the user at a given instant of time. The underlying model does not consider the sequence of LBS requests sent by the user over time. We refer to this privacy guarantee as snapshot sender k-anonymity, and any solution enforcing it as snapshot k-anonymization. As shown below, snapshot sender k-anonymity protects only against attackers who are unaware of the user trajectories, i.e. treating requests at different instants as independent even if they actually originate from the same user. Typical snapshot anonymization algorithms [19, 24, 20, 16] are based on hiding the sender's precise location l in the request, substituting instead a cloak, i.e. a region containing l. The cloak is usually chosen from among regions of a pre-defined shape (circular, rectangular etc.), to include locations of at least k-1 other mobile users. We refer to the cloak selection policy as snapshot k-anonymous policy. We illustrate a snapshot 2-anonymous policy next. Table 1 : Snapshot policy-aware 2-anonymous policies users at two instants t1 and t2. Table 1 shows the cloak selection policies P1 and P2 that select cloaks from the quadrants of a static quad-tree based partitioning of the geographic space. Suppose at instant t1, user 1 sends an LBS request L1. Policy P1 anonymizes L1 by substituting the location in the request with the cloak R2 (shown in Figure 1 ). Note that R2 includes the location of users 1, 2, 3 and a request sent by any one them is anonymized by P1 using the same cloak R2. Thus when an attacker, who has access to the user locations at t1 and policy P1, observes the anonymized request with cloak R2, he cannot distinguish whether the sender is user 1 or 2 or 3. Thus P1 provides snapshot sender 2-anonymity. Suppose user 1 sends another LBS request L2 at instant t2. Policy P2 anonymizes L2 by substituting the locations in the request with cloak R3 (shown in Figure 2 ). An attacker who has access to user locations at t2 and policy P2 cannot distinguish the sender among users 1, 4 and 5 since requests from all these users are anonymized using R3. Thus P2 provides snapshot sender 2-anonymity. Note that policy P2 does not take into account the user locations at instant t1 and their anonymizations using policy P1 (and vice versa).
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A natural first candidate solution to anonymizing LBS request logs is to leverage previous work on snapshot k-anonymization [19, 24, 20, 16] , anonymizing for each time instant t the snapshot of requests at t (independently of how snapshots at other instants are anonymized). Unfortunately snapshot-by-snapshot anonymization of a request log does not provide sender k-anonymity against an attacker who has access to the user trajectories for the period the requests are logged. The next example illustrates this point.
EXAMPLE 2.
Recall the setting in Example 1 and assume that the LBS logs the user requests. To anonymize the log, the LBS uses policies P1 and P2. Moreover, user ids are replaced with meaningless identifiers, however in order to preserve the linkage between requests sent from the same trajectory, the same identifier is used for all requests sent by the same user.
Assume the anonymized request log is observed by an attacker who knows P1 and P2 and the user locations at t1 and t2. As in Example 1, the attacker can use the knowledge of the policies to limit the first request's sender to one of {1, 2, 3} and the second request's sender to one of {1, 4, 5}. Next he uses the additional knowledge that both requests where sent from the same user trajectory: he intersects the two sets of potential senders and concludes that user 1 must be the sender, breaching sender 2-anonymity! 2
In Example 2 the attacker is able to breach sender 2-anonymity because the request log enables him to associate the two requests to the same trajectory and the snapshot 2-anonymization policy P2 does not take into account the anonymization of request from user 1 at instant t1 using policy P1. Thus the above breach could have been avoided if either the two requests were not linked with the same trajectory in the anonymized log, or if instead of policy P2 we used a policy P 2 that anonymizes requests from users 1, 2 and 3 using the region R3. While we are free to change the anonymization policy to preserve sender k-anonymity, we do not wish to entirely remove the association of requests with a trajectory in the anonymized LBS request log since this is valuable information for analytics. This poses an interesting challenge for the LBS: how can it publish an anonymized LBS request log that includes some form of linkage information between requests and trajectories, without jeopardizing k-anonymity of the users?
The LBS needs to ensure anonymity against an attacker who knows the user trajectories for the period the LBS requests are logged (we call the attacker T-aware) and who knows the "design" i.e. the policy used to pick cloaks for anonymizing requests (Paware attacker). We call this problem the offline TP-aware sender k-anonymity problem since an LBS request r can be anonymized taking into account all request in the log, including those sent after r. We contrast this with the problem of online TP-aware sender kanonymity, in which (i) the LBS is not trusted, therefore an LBS request is anonymized before it is sent to the LBS, and (ii) the anonymization of an LBS request takes into account only the history of requests so far and cannot be altered after observing subsequent requests by the same user. We leave the problem of online TP-aware sender k-anonymity for future work.
In this paper, we propose a solution to the offline TP-aware sender k-anonymity problem. It consists of publishing a sequence of cloaks to anonymize the sequence of LBS requests sent by a user over a period of time. With each cloak in the sequence we associate a set of LBS requests devoid of any location and sender identity information. The LBS requests associated with a sequence S of cloaks represents LBS requests by users whose trajectories pass through S. We thus preserve some association between LBS requests and the trajectories they were sent along (though we introduce some uncertainty as requests are not tied to a single trajectory, but rather to a "bundle" of trajectories compatible with S). To provide TPaware sender k-anonymity, we choose S such that at least k distinct user trajectories are anonymized to S.
The technical challenge we need to solve is to find, among the (exponentially) many possible ways of bundling user trajectories together, the one that results in the maximum utility for the consumer of the anonymized log. Intuitively, we are looking to minimize the cloak sizes, so as to improve the precision of the anonymized information.
Our contributions include the following:
[1] We identify and formulate the problem of offline sender kanonymization of LBS request logs, which protects against the class of trajectory-and policy-aware attackers. We define a novel privacy guarantee, TP-aware sender k-anonymity.
[2] We study the problem of finding, among all the offline policies that provide TP-aware sender k-anonymity, one with the optimum utility for the consumer of the anonymized LBS log. We show that finding the optimum offline policy that uses cloaks chosen among the quadrants of a quad-tree based partition of the map is NP-Complete. This is significant, showing that guarding against T-aware attackers is computationally harder than against T-unaware attackers: it was shown in [16] that for such cloak types optimum snapshot k-anonymization is in PTIME.
[3] We show that optimum TP-aware sender k-anonymity is PTIMEapproximable (i.e. one can always find, in polynomial time, an anonymization whose utility is within well defined bounds relative to the optimum utility). In particular, we describe a novel lapproximation algorithm to anonymize an LBS request log spanning user trajectories of length l.
[4] We implement and experimentally evaluate our anonymization algorithm and show that it is practical and scales well with the number of user trajectories: it takes less than 4 minutes to anonymize 2 million trajectories of length 30 for users moving around the San Francisco Bay area. This is a performant running time for an offline algorithm, especially since we show that alternate solutions are impractically slow and/or provide worse approximations.
Paper outline. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe a prevailing model of an LBS. We define offline TP-aware sender k-anonymity in Section 3 and describe our solution that uses a sequence of cloaks to preserve TP-aware sender k-anonymity while publishing some linkage information between anonymized requests and bundle of user trajectories. In Section 4 we show that finding the optimum offline policy that provides TPaware k-anonymity is NP-hard and hence in Section 4.1 we propose a polynomial time approximation algorithm. In Section 4.1.3 we describe optimizations and our implementation of the optimized approximation algorithm. We report on the experimental evaluation in Section 5, discuss related work in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
LOCATION BASED SERVICES
This section introduces a prevailing model of location-based services, based on automatic computation of the location of user mobile devices. It describes various entities in the LBS ecosystem, the data flow among these entities and the data logged by them.
As shown in Figure 3 there are four core elements in the delivery of a location-based service: the user making a request, typically called the sender, the (wireless) Communication Service Provider, denoted as CSP, the location server that computes the location of the mobile device, denoted as LS, and the Location Based Service (LBS) provider, denoted as LBS. We view the CSP, Location Server and LBS provider to be trusted agents and assume that the communication between them is secure.
To access an LBS, a sender uses an application on the mobile device (typically provided by the LBS). The application fetches the location from the run-time environment on the mobile device, which in turn gets it from the location server. The location server is a specialized network component in CSP's network, known as Mobile Positioning Center (MPC) in the CDMA standard, that provides access to device locations for E911 [1] and other locationbased services. The location can also be obtained from a service that operates outside the CSPs network and can compute the location of a mobile device using the signal strength of nearby celltowers and WiFi access points observed on the mobile device (e.g. SkyHook [8] and Google Location Service [4] ). The application then sends a service request containing the location and the specifics of information/operation requested by the sender (e.g. "car dealership in 5 mile radius from my location" or "notify me when a friend is within 1 mile from my location"). The LBS provider responds to the LBS request using the location sent with the request.
Henceforth we abstract from these details and focus on the treatment of location data and the LBS service requests in the LBS ecosystem. For simplicity of presentation (and without loss of generality), we model a geographic area as a 2-dimensional space and user's location as integer coordinates within this space.
As a mobile user moves and sends LBS requests from different locations at different times, the LBS provider logs these requests.
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Figure 3: LBS Model
Each logged request is associated with the identifier of the device that sent the request (e.g. IP-address or MAC-address). This allows the LBS provider to identify the requests sent by the same user in the LBS request log and assemble a history of LBS requests for each user. We represent a user history of length l as a triple
where uid is the userid of the user, loci is the location of the user at instant i and Vi the request sent by the user at instant i. (For presentation simplicity and without loss of generality, we abstract away the actual timestamps, representing them as natural numbers.) Each request is a set of name-value pairs containing the categories and specifics of the sought services (e.g. {(poi, rest),(cat, ital), (dist, 2mi)} represents "find Italian restaurants within 2 miles of my location"). An LBS request log consists of a set of user histories. The snapshot at instant i contains for each user her location at instant i and the request (if any) it made at i.
EXAMPLE 3.
Consider an LBS request log containing the histories ua, u b , uc, us, ut of users Alice, Bob, Carrol, Sam and Tom, whose devices have IDs ida, id b ,idc,ids and idt, respectively: (3, 3) , (3, 3) , _, v6 ) From this log we can read that at instant 1, the LBS logs the requests v1, v3 and v5 sent by the users Alice, Bob and Sam (respectively). Alice was at that time at location (1, 2), given as coordinates in the 2-dimensional map. At instant 2, the LBS logs the requests v2, v4 and v6 sent by Alice, Caroll and Tom (respectively). Alice had by now moved to location (1, 3). _ stands for "no request" (Bob made no request at instant 2).
The set of user history objects contains very useful data for researchers and advertisers since it can be used to answer queries such as "the requests sent by users that move from location A to location B". As mentioned in Section 1, previous work on sender anonymity in an LBS setting has focused on anonymizing snapshots independently of each other [20, 19, 24, 20, 16] . Example 2 showed that leveraging such work to user histories by anonymizing them snapshot-by-snapshot leads to privacy breach. A more holistic anonymization is called for.
A NOVEL PRIVACY GUARANTEE
In this section we describe our approach for anonymizing the set of user histories to provide sender k-anonymity against the class of attackers who are aware of user trajectories and the anonymization algorithm, in the sense that the attacker cannot reduce the set of possible suspects to less than k. The anonymization preserves linkage information between LBS requests and trajectories to an extent that does not pose any risk to the sender k-anonymity of the users.
Bundle The key concept we introduce to model an anonymized user history is called a "bundle". Intuitively, a bundle object corresponds to a set of user histories bundled together. It lists a sequence of cloaks such that the cloak at instant i contains the locations at instant i of all users in the bundle. The bundle also lists for each instant i the set of requests issued at instant i by the bundled users.
More formally, a bundle is a tuple (bid, r1, . . . , r l , s1, . . . s l ), where bid is a unique bundle identifier, r1, . . . , r l is a sequence of l cloaks, and s1, . . . , s l is a sequence of l sets of LBS requests. A cloak is a 2-dimensional region (e.g. [(x1, y1), (x2, y2)] for axisparallel rectangles, where (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) are the coordinates of the lower-left and upper-right corners of the rectangle). Recall from Section 2 that a request is a set of name-value pairs devoid of any identifier or location information. EXAMPLE 4. The following are examples of bundles that use the cloaks shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 and the requests described in Example 3.
[Masking] Given a user history u = (uid, loc1, loc2, . . . loc l , V1, V2, . . . V l ) and a bundle b = (bid, r1, · · · , r l , s1 · · · s l ), we say that b masks u if for each i ∈ [1, . . . l], loci ∈ ri and Vi ∈ si. Instead of publishing the set of user histories, our proposal is that the LBS publish a set of bundles that masks the user history objects in its log. Note that within a bundle, the association of the LBS requests with the trajectory of the actual sender is obfuscated since for any two distinct instants i, j and any requests Vi, Vj the bundle only states that their sender locations belong to the cloaks ri, rj, but not whether they were actually sent by the same user. Insuring sender k-anonymity consists in choosing bundle objects such for each request in the bundle, an attacker cannot limit the set of potential senders to less than k. We formalize this next.
Anonymization Policy We define an anonymization policy as a function P that, given a set of user history objects U , associates to each user history object u a bundle object b (denoted P (U, u) = b) such that b masks u. We sometimes write P (u) = b when the LBS log U is clear from the context. EXAMPLE 6. The following anonymization policy P3 anonymizes the 5 user history objects in Example 3 using the bundle objects shown in Example 4. P3(ua) = b1, P3(u b ) = b3, P3(uc) = b3, P3(us) = b1, P3(ut) = b2. 
TP-aware Sender k-Anonymity
We next define our novel privacy guarantee. To do so we need to formalize the class of attackers who are aware of user trajectories and the anonymization policy.
Attacker Model We target a strong information-theoretic definition of privacy therefore we model the attacker as a function taking certain input to launch the attack, with no bounds on the computational resources expended during the attack. The only assumptions are on what input the function takes (intuitively, the information that the attacker sees). The input comprises:
• the anonymity degree k;
• the specific anonymization policy P used by the LBS;
• the trajectory of all the users (the first and second components of each user history triple); • the published bundles.
We refer to the class of such attackers as Trajectory-aware and Policy-aware (in short, TP-aware) attackers. The attack function models the following attack: starting from the observation of a set B of bundle objects, the knowledge of trajectories of all the users and the anonymization policy P , the attacker reverse engineers P to obtain the possible user histories that are anonymized by P to bundles in B.
We are now ready to define TP-aware sender k-anonymity. Intuitively, we consider it a breach of sender k-anonymity if for any bundle b the attacker succeeds in reducing the number of candidate user histories that can possibly be anonymized to b, to less than k. Therefore, our privacy guarantee ensures that for each observed bundle object b there are at least k user histories that are anonymized to b under the chosen policy.
DEFINITION 2.
[TP-aware Sender k-anonymity] Let P be an anonymization policy and U be a set of user histories. Let B be the set of bundles obtained using the policy P . We say that B provides TP-aware sender k-anonymity for U if for each bundle b ∈ B there are at least k distinct user histories in U that are anonymized to b under P . We say that policy P provides TP-aware sender kanonymity, if for every set of user histories U , the set of bundles {P (u)|u ∈ U } provides TP-aware sender k-anonymity to U .
Note that even with unlimited computational resources, the best the attacker can hope to achieve is to exactly reverse engineer the inverse image of the published bundles under P (as opposed to just approximating it). Since P is defined such that the inverse image contains at least k possible user histories for each bundle, even the exact inversion of P does not breach privacy.
We next show a policy that breaks TP-aware sender 2-anonymity.
EXAMPLE 7. Policy P3 of Example 6 anonymizes the set of user histories {ua, u b , uc, us, ut} shown in Example 3 to the set of bundles {b1, b2, b3} shown in Example 4. When the TP-aware attacker observes b1, he tries to reverse engineer the user-history objects that could have anonymized to it. He finds two candidates, ua and us, corresponding to users Alice and Sam. Similarly for b3, there are 2 users u b and uc that could be anonymized to b3. In contrast, when the attacker observes b2, there is only one user history ut that is anonymized to b2 under P3. Thus P3 does not provide TP-aware sender 2-anonymity.
We next illustrate a policy that does provide TP-aware sender 2-anonymity. EXAMPLE 8. For the five user histories in Example 3, we describe the following anonymization policy P4 that uses the bundles shown in Example 4. P4(ua) = b2, P4(u b ) = b3, P4(uc) = b3, P4(us) = b2, P4(ut) = b2. There are at least 2 user histories anonymized by P4 to each one of the published bundles, b2 and b3. When the attacker observes the published bundles, he tries to reverse engineer P4, but finds at least 2 users for each of b2 and b3. Hence P2 provides TP-aware sender 2-anonymity. 
OPTIMUM-COST ANONYMIZATION
For the same set of user-history objects there may exist several anonymization policies that provide TP-aware sender k-anonymity, raising the obvious question of which one to use. In this section we address the problem of finding the k-anonymous policy of highest utility to the consumers of the published log. Prior work [16, 20, 19, 24] on snapshot sender k-anonymity proposes that one way to maximize utility is to minimize the area of the cloaks. For the log of LBS requests, an analogous measure would be to minimize the sum of the cloak areas used in the bundles.
Cost of a bundle. We introduce the cost of a bundle to quantitatively measure utility (maximum utility means minimum cost). Given a bundle b = (bid, r1 · · · r l , s1 · · · s l ), we define the cost of bundle b as the sum of the areas of the cloaks in its cloak sequence: Cost(b) = l i=1 area(ri). Given a collection U of user objects and an anonymizing policy P , we define the cost of P for anonymizing U as Cost(P, U ) = u∈U Cost(P (u)).
Optimum policy We next focus on the problem of finding the optimum (minimum cost) policy that provides TP-aware sender kanonymity to a given set of user-history objects.
Notice that the TP-aware sender k-anonymity guarantee is at least as computationally hard to enforce as its P-aware snapshot (T-unaware) version (the latter is a special case of the former for trajectory length 1). It is therefore natural to avoid settings in which snapshot anonymization is already intractable. For P-aware snapshot k-anonymity, it was shown in [16] that the complexity of finding the optimum policy depends crucially upon the type of cloaks used for anonymization. For instance, finding the optimum policy among all the policies that use circular cloaks is NP-hard (in the number of users) [16] , even if the cloak centers can be chosen only from a given set of points (e.g. public landmarks such as libraries, train stations or cell towers) and the only choice is on the length of the cloak radius. In contrast, one can find an optimum snapshot policy in polynomial time if the cloaks are chosen among the quadrants of a quad tree [16] . These results suggest that, for a chance at practically feasible anonymization, our investigation would best focus on quad-tree based cloaks. This is indeed the case as shown in the next theorem. Anonymization using Circular cloaks. Let U be a set of userhistory objects and SC be a set of points in the 2-dimensional space that contains the trajectories of the users. We define circular cloak sequence as a sequence of cloaks where each cloak is centered at some point from SC, with no restriction on the radius. Let P be the set of all those policies that use circular cloak sequence in the bundles for anonymizing user-history objects. The problem of Optimum Offline TP-aware k-anonymization with Circular cloaks is to find a policy in P that minimizes the cost of anonymizing U .
(Extended Version) Theorem 4. Optimum Offline TP-aware kanonymization with Circular cloaks is NP-hard.
The quad tree is a well-known structure for organizing spatial data, and it has been used in a number of anonymization solutions [19, 24, 16] for snapshot sender k-anonymity. More important, this is the only cloak class for which optimum P-aware snapshot k-anonymization is known to be PTIME-computable [16] .
Anonymization using Quad-cloaks For the remainder of the paper, we consider policies that use cloaks picked from among the quadrants of a quad-tree partitioning of the geographic region. The root node of the quad-tree represents the entire region (assumed square shaped, without loss of generality) which is then partitioned into 4 equal square quadrants, each of whom represent a child node of the root. Each quadrant is then again divided into 4 equal subquadrants that correspond to grandchildren of the root. This fourway splitting goes on recursively until the desired level of granularity for the minimum region is reached. Figure 4 shows a part of a quad-tree based partitioning: region R8 represents a quadrant in the quad-tree that is divided into 4 equal sub-quadrants (e.g. R4). The sub-quadrant R4 is further divided into R0, R1, R2, and R3.
Given a quad-tree representation Q of a region, we refer to a sequence of cloaks, where each cloak is one of the quadrants of Q, as a quad-cloak sequence. For instance, R0, R3 is a quadcloak sequence of length 2 that uses the quadrants of the quadtree in Figure 4 . A policy that anonymizes user histories using bundles with quad-cloak sequence is referred to as a quad-cloak policy (since we consider only such policies for the remainder of the paper, we will drop the qualifier whenever convenient).
Optimum quad-cloak policy. Given a quad-tree Q and a set U of user histories, there exist several quad-cloak policies that can be used to anonymize U . We show that their number is exponential. Assume that U comprises n user histories, each of length l, and the quad-tree Q is of height h. For any location in the trajectory of a user history, there are h cloaks in Q that mask it (all the cloaks from leaf to root in Q). Therefore, for a trajectory of length l, there are h l different quad-cloak sequences masking it. There are hence h (nl) different ways of anonymizing the n histories in U using quad-cloak sequences from Q (although not all of them provide TP-aware sender k-anonymity).
The problem of optimum offline TP-aware sender k-anonymity with quad-cloaks is to find, given LBS log U , a quad-cloak bundle B that has the minimum cost of anonymizing U . Clearly a brute-force search among all h (nl) quad-tree policies would take exponential time in the log size. As shown by our next result one cannot hope for PTIME (unless P = NP). THEOREM 1. Optimum offline TP-aware sender k-anonymity with quad-cloaks is NP-complete (in the size of the LBS log).
The significance of this result is that it shows that providing optimum TP-aware sender k-anonymity is strictly a harder problem than the optimum snapshot k-anonymity studied in prior work.
Approximation Algorithm
The next best thing in lieu of a polynomial-time optimum solution is to find a polynomial time approximation algorithm with bounded approximation factor. We show such an algorithm next.
At high level, we proceed as follows. We restrict the choices of cloak sequences that a policy can use, to a subset of all the possible choices of quad-cloak sequences. This amounts to identifying a subset S of the set S of all possible quad-cloak policies. The subset S is chosen such that an optimum quad-cloak policy relative to S can be found in polynomial time, and that this policy's cost is within a bounded factor of the optimum quad-cloak policy in S.
Our algorithm utilizes a structural relationship that exists between quad-cloak sequences of a given length l.
1-step Generalization and Generalization Graph Let Q be a quad-tree and s be a quad-cloak sequence of length l that uses quadrants of Q. Let s be a quad-cloak sequence obtained by replacing one of the cloaks in s with its parent in Q. We refer to s as 1-step generalization of s. The 1-step generalization relation induces a directed acyclic graph over all the quad-cloak sequences of a given length l obtained using a quad-tree Q. We refer to this graph as the Generalization Graph (G-graph for short). Figure 6 shows part of the G-graph induced by 1-step generalization on the quad-cloak sequences of length 2 that use quadrants of the quad-tree shown in Figure 4 .
In a G-graph of length l it is easy to observe that a trajectory of length l masked by a quad-cloak sequence s is also masked by the 1-step generalization of s. We refer to this property as the containment property. As an example, consider the trajectory of the user a shown in Figure 5 . This trajectory is masked not only by the quad-cloak sequence R0, R3 shown in Figure 6 , but also by the sequences corresponding to its ancestors in the G-graph (e.g. R0, R4 and R4, R4 ).
Our approach to finding a subset of quad-cloak policies reduces to finding a tree-shaped subgraph of the G-graph: Given a G-graph G of length l and an LBS log U , let PG be the set of all the policies that use quad-cloak sequences from G. The problem of optimum offline T P -aware sender k-anonymity with quad-cloaks is to find the optimum policy in PG. Since this is N P -hard, we identify a subspace T of the G, and find the optimum policy in the set PT of all policies that use cloak sequences from T . The choice of T is such that the optimum policy can be found in PTIME and its cost is a bounded approximation of the optimum policy in PG.
G-tree of a G-graph Given a G-graph G, we define a Generalization tree (G-tree) of G as a tree T in which every node has bounded degree and that preserves the ancestor-descendant relationship of G. Formally: a) The nodes of T are a subset of the nodes in G. b) If y is the parent of x in T , then y must be a ancestor of x in G. c) Each node in T has a finite bounded degree f (i.e. each non-leaf node has at most f children).
Conditions a) and b) ensure that the set PT of all the policies that use the cloak sequences in T is a subset of all the quad-cloak policies PG. In addition, property b) above also preserves the Ggraph containment in the corresponding G-tree. As a result any trajectory masked by a node in T is also masked by its parent in T . As described next, this property along with condition c) is key in finding a polynomial time approximation solution.
Note that using the above definition, one can obtain multiple Gtrees corresponding to a G-graph. The choice of a G-tree dictates the bounded approximation factor and the complexity of the algorithm that achieves the bound. We address the issue of identifying a G-tree with bounded approximation factor in Section 4.1.2. We first describe in Section 4.1.1 a generic algorithm that takes as input a G-tree T and finds in PTIME the optimum policy w.r.t. to PT .
Min-Cost Policy in Any G-tree
The algorithm exploits two unique properties of the policies in PT . Using the first property we define equivalence classes of policies such that all equivalent policies have the same cost and anonymize the same number of trajectories to each quad-cloak sequence in T . This allows us, instead of exploring a search space of policies, to explore a smaller search space of policy equivalence classes. Even though there are fewer equivalence classes than policies, the total number of choices is still exponential (in the number of cloak sequences in T ). The second property allows us to use a divide and conquer strategy to prune and search in polynomial time the exponential search space of equivalence classes and find the one corresponding to the optimum policy.
Property 1: Cost of a policy is determined by the number of trajectories anonymized to each node in T . For a policy in PT , the property of being TP-aware sender k-anonymous and the cost of the anonymization depends upon how many trajectories are anonymized by each node n in T , being indifferent to which particular trajectories are anonymized to n. EXAMPLE 9. Consider trajectories a and b shown in Figure 5 . Let P1 and P2 be two anonymization policies that anonymize trajectories a and b as shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8 . P1 anonymizes a to cloak sequence R0, R4 and b to R4, R4 , whereas P2 anonymizes a to R4, R4 and b to R0, R4 . Except for this difference, all the other trajectories are anonymized identically in P1 and P2. Since Cost(P1(a)) = Cost(P2(b)) and Cost(P1(b)) = Cost(P2(a)), we have Cost(P1(a))+Cost(P1(b)) = Cost(P2(b))+ Cost(P2(a)) and the costs of P1 and P2 are identical. We formalize this observation as an equivalence relation among policies in PT that use quad-cloak sequences in G-tree T . Two policies in PT are equivalent for a given set of trajectories if every node in G-tree T anonymizes the same number of trajectories under both policies. LEMMA 1. If policies P1, P2 are equivalent for a G-tree T , then (a) P1 and P2 have the same cost; and (b) P1 provides TPaware sender k-anonymity on T if and only if so does P2.
We exploit equivalence to replace the search space of policies in PT with the smaller space of equivalence classes. We represent equivalence classes using a Configuration function.
Configuration The function Configuration is defined to keep track of the number of trajectories anonymized by each node m in a G-tree T . For technical convenience, this is done by equivalently tracking for each node m the number of trajectories that are masked by m yet are not anonymized using m or any of its descendants. We refer to these trajectories as passed up (the responsibility of anonymizing them is passed up to m's ancestors). 
where m has f children m1, . . ., m f . We say that C is complete if C(r) = 0.
Condition (i) in the above Definition 3 restricts a configuration to represent only masking policies and (ii) represents the fact that a trajectory can be anonymized to only one cloak sequence. Note that by Lemma 1(a), all policies in the equivalence class represented by a configuration C have the same cost. We call this the cost Costc of the configuration C. We can compute this cost directly using the configuration and without enumerating any policy: it is easy to compute the number a(m) of trajectories anonymized by node m of T , as the difference between the number of trajectories passed up by m's children and the number of trajectories passed up by m itself; Costc simply multiplies a(m) with the area of the cloak sequence represented by m, summing up over all m ∈ T . DEFINITION 4. [Configuration cost] Let U be a set of trajectories and C be a configuration of the G-tree T . We define the cost of C for U , denoted Costc(C, U ), as We can show that the configuration cost is precisely the cost of the represented policies:
(Extended Version) Lemma 4. Given a set U of n trajectories of length l, a G-tree T of quad-cloak sequences of length l, a policy P that usees cloak sequences from T and a configuration C representing P 's equivalence class, we have Costc(C, U ) = Cost(P, U ).
Thus finding the optimum quad-tree policy that uses cloak sequences from T to anonymize a set U of trajectories is equivalent to finding the optimum configuration C of the tree T w.r.t. U . Our algorithm does exactly that, i.e. we first find the minimum cost configuration and then materialize a policy corresponding to it.
Checking Sender Anonymity from Configurations Since the algorithm manipulates configurations instead of policies, we need a check that a configuration corresponds to TP-aware sender kanonymous policies. By Lemma 1(b), either all represented policies qualify, or none does. It turns out that it suffices to check directly that the configuration satisfies a property we call k-summing.
DEFINITION 5.
[k-summing] Let U be a set of trajectories and C a configuration of the tree T rooted at r. C is a k-summing configuration if
• for a leaf node m
• for an internal node m let ∆ =
Intuitively, in Definition 5, clause (i) states that if the quad-cloak sequence corresponding to node m masks less than k trajectories, none of them can be anonymized by m lest k-anonymity be compromised. The responsibility of anonymizing all d(m) of them is passed up to m's ancestors (C(m) = d(m)). By clause (ii), if there are at least k trajectories, then either all of them are passed up, or at most d(m) − k (since at least k must be anonymized to the same cloak sequence to preserve k-anonymity). For an internal node m, ∆ represents the number of trajectories whose anonymization responsibility is passed up from m's children to m. If there are too few of them (less than k) then they cannot be anonymized using the cloak sequence of m, who in turn passes the responsibility to its ancestors (in clause (iii)). Otherwise, m has the choice of either anonymizing none of them (C(m) = ∆ in clause (iv)), or anonymizing at least k and passing up at most ∆ − k. LEMMA 2. Let T be a G-tree of quad-cloak sequences and U be a set of trajectories. Let C be a configuration of T for anonymizing U , and P be a policy in the equivalence class C represents. P provides TP-aware k-anonymity to U if and only if C is a ksumming configuration.
Lemma 2 justifies an algorithm that explores the space of ksumming configurations, in search for a complete minimum-cost configuration. But for a set of n trajectories and a G-tree T with m nodes there are O(n m ) possible configurations. Next we describe the second property of the policies in PT that enables a divide-andconquer approach to find the optimum k-summing configuration.
Property 2: Optimum cost of anonymizing a subset of trajectories using a node in T can be computed locally Let C be a k-summing configuration C of a G-tree T of quad-cloak sequences. For a node m in T , C(m) represents the number of unanonymized trajectories passed up by m. These trajectories are anonymized at one of the ancestors of m and hence they do not affect how the d(m) − C(m) trajectories are anonymized using m and its descendants. Thus for a given value of C(m), one can optimize the anonymization of d(m) − C(m) trajectories using m and its descendants independently of the rest of the trajectories and the rest of T . Before we describe how we compute this local optimum for each m, we need to point out that at this stage we don't know the value of C(m) in the optimum configuration. For this reason we compute the optimum costs of passing up 0, 1 . . . d(m) trajectories at m i.e. all possible values of C(m). For each pair (m, u) such that C(m) = u, the minimum cost is computed among all possible configurations of the subtree rooted at m (as there are many possible configurations with C(m) = u).
Computing all local optimum costs To compute the (local) optimum value of passing up u trajectories at node m, the algorithm considers all possible counts 0, 1
of trajectories passed by m's children m1, . . . , m f respectively. Then it recursively computes the corresponding minimum cost for each (mi, ui) pair. Redundant cost re-computation for m, u pairs is avoided by a memoization technique: i.e., by storing the result in the corresponding cell of a bi-dimensional matrix M indexed by the nodes of T and values of u. To enable the easy retrieval of the min-cost configuration from M , the entries for node m carry, besides the minimum cost, some bookkeeping information relating to the configurations of the children of m.
This yields the following dynamic programming algorithm Trajanon that, given a set U of trajectories of length l and a G-tree T with cloak sequences of length l, fills in a configuration matrix 
else {m is a non-leaf node} 15: let m1, m2, . . . , m f are children of m 16:
for all u in F(m) do 17:
that minimize the quantity 18:
where Selecting the optimum configuration The information in M suffices to retrieve in PTIME a minimum-cost configuration. The optimum configuration is obtained when the optimum cost of C(r) = 0 is computed, where r is the root node of T (the root cannot pass up any trajectories as there is no larger cloak sequence to anonymize them with). After that it is easy to retrieve the complete configuration from M in polynomial time by a top-down traversal of T . The minimum cost entry M [r][0] for root r lists for its each child mi the value C(mi) = ui leading to the minimum cost. Now inspect for each mi the ui entry in M , picking again the minimum cost entry for passing up ui trajectories at mi and continue recursively until all leaf nodes are reached.
Complexity analysis The running time of Algorithm Traj-anon is dominated by steps 16-18. For internal node m, it ranges each of u, u1, u2, . . . , u f over at most |U | values (since
) iterations where the degree f represents the maximum number of children of a node m ∈ T . Summing up over all nodes m of the tree subspace T , we obtain the complexity of Traj-anon in (O|T ||U | f +1 ). The exponent f of the polynomial depends upon the chosen G-tree T of the G-graph.
Policy from Configuration We do not enumerate all the policies of the equivalence class corresponding to the optimum configuration. Note that a configuration C is exponentially more succinct than an explicit listing of the policies it represents; if we focus on any node m alone, there are exponentially many ways to pick C(m) trajectories among those occurring in m. Yet, we can obtain one of the policies C represents in linear time by nondeterministically selecting the C(m) trajectories for each node m.
Choosing the G-tree for l-Approximation
Our approach for finding an approximation solution to the problem of optimum TP-ware sender k-anonymity using quad-tree policy consists of a) identifying a subset S of all the possible quadcloak sequences and b) finding the optimum policy among those policies that only uses the cloak sequences from S .
In Section 4.1.1 we described an algorithm Traj-anon that can find the optimum policy w.r.t. any G-tree of the G-graph G of quadcloak sequences. In this section we show how to choose a G-tree Tu such that the optimum policy w.r.t. Tu is a bounded approximation of the overall optimum policy w.r.t. G. Tu is obtained by limiting the choice of cloak sequences to uniform cloak sequences.
Uniform Cloak-Sequence Tree Let D be a G-graph of quadcloak sequences of length l that use quadrants of a quad-tree Q. Consider a quad-cloak sequence in D in which all cloaks have the same size. We call such a cloak sequence uniform quad-cloak sequence. The cloak sequences R0, R0 , R0, R3 and R4, R4 , shown in Figure 6 , are examples of uniform quad-cloak sequences. Let s be a uniform quad-cloak sequence in D. Let sp be the cloak sequence obtained by replacing each cloak in s with its parent in Q. We refer to sp as the total 1-step generalization of s. The subset of uniform quad-cloak sequences from D and the total 1-step generalization function define a tree Tu as follows:
• each uniform quad-cloak sequence in D is a node in Tu.
• If sp is the total 1-step generalization of s ∈ Tu, then sp ∈ Tu and we set sp as the parent of s.
It is easy to check that Tu is a G-tree of G-graph D.
We refer to this tree as the Uniform Cloak-Sequence Tree (UTree) since it includes only and all the uniform quad-cloak sequences of the G-graph. The root of the U-tree is the sequence of quad-cloaks corresponding to the root of the quad tree Q. The leaf nodes are the uniform cloak sequences where each cloak is a quad-cloak corresponding to a leaf node of Q. The intermediate nodes are uniform quad-cloak sequences where each cloak is a quad-cloak corresponding to a non-leaf node of Q. The height of the U-tree is the same as that of Q i.e. h, since for each leaf uniform cloak sequence h − 1 successive total 1-step generalizations lead to the root uniform cloak sequence. EXAMPLE 10. For the G-graph G shown in Figure 6 , the Utree Tu consists of the nodes on the bottom level (e.g. R0, R0 ) and the root R4, R4 of G (missing G's second level). The edges in Tu connect all bottom level nodes to the root. Notice that the parent node is obtained using total 1-step generalization of the child nodes in Tu. Also the parent R4, R4 and its child nodes are in an ancestor-descendant relationship in G. Since the length of the cloak sequences is l = 2, each node in Tu has 4 2 children. 2
Uniform policy A policy that only uses uniform quad-cloak sequences in the bundles is referred to as uniform quad-cloak policy. Note that in a uniform quad-cloak policy, the cloaks are of the same size within a bundle, but not necessarily across bundles.
THEOREM 2. Given a set U of trajectories of length l, a quadtree Q and degree of anonymity k, the cost of the optimum uniform policy that provides TP-aware sender k-anonymity is at most l times that of the overall optimum policy that provides TP-aware sender k-anonymity.
To obtain the optimum uniform policy that anonymizes a set U of trajectories of length l, we call the Traj-anon algorithm with U-tree Tu of length l as input. For a U-tree Tu of length l, each non-leaf node has 4 l child nodes. Substituting this value for f in algorithm The obtained configuration represents the equivalence class of policies that have the optimum cost among all the uniform policies, for anonymizing U . By Lemma 3 and Theorem 2, we have: THEOREM 3. When taking the U-tree as input, Algorithm Trajanon computes an l-approximation solution to the problem of optimum offline T P -aware sender k-anonymity.
As described earlier the complexity of Algorithm Traj-anon depends upon the maximum degree of a node in the input G-tree. When the input is the U-tree, Traj-anon runs in (O|Tu||U | 4 l +1 ).
Clearly, the exponent 4 l + 1 is impractically high as we expect a large number of trajectories. In the next section we describe our optimization techniques to reduce the complexity of Traj-anon to low-degree PTIME.
Optimizations
In this section we describe optimizations to reduce the complexity of the Traj-anon algorithm without degrading the approximation factor. Due to space limitations, we sketch the high-level ideas, relegating details to Section 4.2.
Recall that the exponent in the complexity of the Traj-anon algorithm is determined by the degree (branching factor) f of the input tree, and that in the case of a U-tree, f = 4 l (as each of the l cloaks in a node n is split into 4 sub-quadrants in the children of n).
Our first optimization modifies the U-tree Tu (in a strategic way) to guarantee a bounded degree f = 4, without eliminating any nodes from Tu. This reduces the complexity of finding the optimum configuration of the new tree structure using Traj-anon, without affecting the approximation factor. To this end, we use another type of G-tree, called a US-tree, that splits "slower" than the U-tree. The idea is to spread the original 4 l -way split that a U-tree node undergoes in a single level into l US-tree levels of 4-way splits. The first-level node (i.e., the original node) splits only the quadrant at the first snapshot, whereas the four second-level nodes split only the quadrants at the second snapshot, and so on. After l levels in the US-tree, the resulting 4 l nodes become uniform quad-cloak sequences again and are exactly the 4 l direct children of the original node in the U-tree. Note that the US-tree has a constant degree f = 4 and roughly half more nodes than the original U-tree.
The Traj-anon algorithm can be applied to the US-tree Tus, yielding an improved time complexity O(|Tus||U | 5 ) (just substitute 4 for f in the complexity analysis of Section 4.1.1). Furthermore, since all nodes in the original U-tree Tu are included in the corresponding US-tree Tus, Traj-anon is guaranteed to find a policy in Tus that is no worse than what it can find in Tu. In fact, the optimal policy from a US-tree can have a potentially better cost because there are more nodes (i.e., quad-cloak sequences) to be chosen from.
While the above improvement leads to a polynomial time algorithm with constant exponent 5, this is still impractically high given the typical number of LBS users in a metro city (in the range of 1 million for a city like San Francisco).
We apply a second optimization idea: we adapt our algorithm from quad-tree to binary-tree partitioning of the space, i.e. each quadrant can be split into 2 semi-quadrants, rather than 4 subquadrants. We construct T usb , the binary tree built from Tus above by extending it with nodes obtained by splitting quadrants into 2 semi-quadrants. This immediately lowers the node degree bound from f = 4 to f = 2, yielding complexity O(|T usb ||U | 3 ). In the next section we describe a succession of additional optimizations yielding the Smart Traj-anon algorithm that has reduced complexity of O(|T usb |(kh)
2 ), where h is the height of T usb and k is the desired level of anonymity. As an additional optimization, we do not materialize the complete binary semi-quad tree: instead, we split a (semi-)quadrant only if one of its 2 children contains at least k trajectories. Notice that due to this construction |T usb | depends on the spatial distribution of trajectories, but is bounded in the worst case by the number of trajectories |U |. Therefore for fixed k and h, Smart Traj-anon scales linearly with |U |.
Optimizations Details (Extended Version)

US-tree
Given a T-uniform tree Tu of uniform cloak sequences of length l, we introduce intermediate nodes (cloak sequences of length l) between a non-leaf node m ∈ Tu and it's child nodes such that the resulting structure has the following properties:
• it is a G-tree .
• has all the nodes of Tu (and some additional nodes).
• y is an ancestor of x in this G-tree, if y is parent of x in Tu.
• each non-leaf node in this G-tree has exactly 4 child nodes.
We refer to this G-tree as US-tree. The nodes that are inserted between a node m ∈ T and its children are not uniform cloak sequences and are obtained by ordered 1-step generalization, that we describe next.
Ordered 1-step generalization. As described earlier, there are l 1-step generalizations of a cloak sequence of length l, one corresponding to each cloak in the cloak sequence. Ordered 1-step generalization refers to the process of obtaining l sequence of cloaks by l "successive" 1-step generalizations, such that the i th 1-step generalization is obtained by replacing the i th cloaks in the cloak sequences obtained by (i − 1) th 1-step generalization.
Given a T-uniform Tu of length l, we obtain the US-tree by inserting intermediate nodes, between node m and its 4 l child nodes, that are obtained by ordered 1-step generalizations of the child nodes. For each child node, we obtain l cloak sequences using ordered 1-step generalization and during the computation of ordered 1-step generalization, the cloak sequence obtained by i th 1-step generalization is made a parent of the (i − 1) th 1-step generalization. Each each child node, we obtain the node m in the l th 1-step generalization.
We use only one node to represent a cloak sequence even if is obtained via total 1-step generalizations or two or more nodes. For all the child nodes, consider the 1st 1-step generalization in the ordered 1-step generalization. Since each quadrant in Q has 4 child nodes, there are 4 child nodes that have identical 1st 1-step generalization. Thus each of these intermediate nodes has 4 child nodes. Similarly each cloak sequence obtained in the i th 1-step generalization is common for 4 intermediate nodes that were obtained (i − 1) th 1-step generalization. In the l th 1-step generalization we obtained the node m from the 4 intermediate nodes obtained by (l − 1) th 1-step generalization. Thus even after inserting the intermediate nodes, the resulting structure is a US-tree, containing all the nodes of Tu, where each non-leaf node has exactly 4 child nodes. Moreover since the parent cloak sequences a 1-step generalization of its child, the parent nodes in G-tree completely masks their child nodes.
Next we adapt the Traj-anon algorithm to find the optimum configuration C for for a given US-tree Tus and a set U of users. C represents the equivalence class of policies that has the optimum cost among policies that use cloak sequences from Tus to anonymize the set U of user-history objects. Moreover the cost of these policies is never worse then the cost of optimum policy that uses only uniform cloak sequences i.e. nodes in Tu.
Since Tus is a quad-tree the complexity of the above algorithm dominated by the steps 16-18 is O(|Tus||U | 5 ) where |Tus| represents the number of nodes in Tusand |U | represents the number of user-history objects. Note that ordered 1-step generalization inserts O(4 l ) nodes between a non-leaf node and its children in Tu, therefore the resulting US-tree Tus has O(m * 4 l ) more nodes then Tu but this number is independent of the number of trajectories hence else {m is a non-leaf node} 15:
let m1, m2, · · · , m4 are children of m 16:
pick u1 ∈ F (m1), u2 ∈ F (m2), · · · , u4 ∈ F (m4) that minimize the quantity 18:
where Even though Traj-anon for a US-tree of length l has reduced complexity in comparison to Traj-anon for a T-uniform of length l, we do trade cost to achieve better complexity. This is shown by the following result.
(Extended Version) Lemma 5. Given a US-tree Tus of length l, T-uniform Tu of length l and a set U of user-history objects of length l and the level of anonymity k, the cost of the optimum ksumming configuration for Tus is never more than the cost of the optimum k-summation configuration for Tu.
As a result the upper bound on the approximation ration i.e l still holds for a US-tree. This follows directly from Lemma 5.
(Extended Version) Lemma 6. Algorithm Modified Traj-anon computes the l-approximation solution to the problem of optimum offline TP-aware sender k-anonymity.
Moreover the average case cost of optimum policy that uses Tus is lower than the policy that uses Tu since when using Tus a policy has more options for choosing a sequence of cloaks to anonymize a user object.
While the above optimization leads to polynomial time algorithm with constant exponent, the degree 5 is still high given the typical number of LBS users in a metro city (in the range of 1 million for city like San Francisco). Next we describe a pair of optimizations to further reduce the complexity of Traj-anon and run-time optimizations to achieve practical running time, while guaranteeing to preserve the approximation bound. These optimizations are similar in spirit to the optimizations for quad-tree based snapshot policy-aware sender k-anonymity described in [16] with the difference that the tree in our study consists of a quad-tree of quad-cloak sequences.
From Quad to Binary Tree
In the US-tree, if anonymizing a trajectory to a node does not provide the desired k-anonymity, the next possible option is the parent node. Since the parent node is 1-step generalization of the child, the cost of the new cloak in the parent cloak sequence is 4 times that of the replaced cloak in the child cloak sequence. As shown in [24] and [16] , the granularity of this cost increase can be reduced by converting a quad-tree into a binary tree by using semiquadrants as cloaks (where a semi-quadrant is obtained by splitting a quadrant into two rectangles, either vertically or horizontally). Use semi-quadrants in the uniform cloak sequences to anonymize the trajectories leads to following:
• The Traj-anon algorithm finds the optimum policy among all the policies that use uniform semi-quadrant cloak sequences.
• The policy obtained using Traj-anon is l-approximation of the optimum policy that use semi-quadrant cloak sequences.
• Using total 1-step generalization we can obtain binary UStree that contains all the uniform semi-quadrant cloak sequences, and in which each node has exactly 2 child nodes.
As a result of this optimization, the complexity of the optimized Traj-anon for a binary US-tree T usb and a set of trajectories U , is O(|T usb ||U | 3 ). In addition, since the semi-quadrants are smaller than the quadrants, this optimization also reduces the average cost of anonymization.
Pruning Suboptimal Configurations
For any node m of the USeq-Btree, in the for loop of step 16, Traj-anon inspects (d(m) − k + 1) configurations (all possible ksumming configurations). We realize that some of these configurations need not be considered, as they are guaranteed to be suboptimal. In fact we claim the following lemma: 
Precomputation
Similar to Bulk dp , there is significant overlap in the computations across iterations of For loop in Step 16 of Modified Trajanon. For example, if one iteration works on the M entry for (m, u), inspecting for instance (m1, u1) and (m2, u2) such that u1 + u2 = u, then the next iteration (m, u + 1) will inspect the cases (m1, u1 + 1), (m2, u2) and (m1, u1), (m2, u2 + 1), among others. The idea is to reuse this computation across iterations.
To this end, we stage the computation in 2 parts. In the first stage we iterate over the O(kh) configurations of both children to compute a temporary matrix temp. There are O(kh) entries in this matrix and the complexity of this stage is bounded by O( (kh) 2 ). In the second stage, we create O(kh) configurations using the O(kh) entries of temp. Thus the running time for the second stage is also bounded by O((kh) 2 ). Therefore the overall complexity of the modified step 16 is O((kh)
2 ) and the overall complexity of the modified algorithm becomes O(|T usb |(kh)
2 ).
Runtime Pruning
We implement a runtime optimization to further reduce the running time of the modified Traj-anon. We create the binary UStree top-down by successively splitting the semi-quadrants, starting from the root node. But we do not eagerly materialize all nodes of the binary US-tree, instead, we split a (semi-)quadrant only if it contains sufficient users to maintain anonymity.
EXPERIMENTS
In this section we describe a set of experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of our Smart (optimized) Traj-anon algorithm. We evaluate scalability and performance and compare the cost of anonymization and execution time of Smart Traj-anon with a set of alternate anonymization techniques. Since we focus exclusively on the Smart version of Traj-anon, we will drop the qualifier in the remainder of the section.
Our experiments show that Traj-anon scales linearly with the number of trajectories and can anonymize up to 2 million trajectories of length 30 within 4 min. We show that the other anonymization techniques either have higher anonymization cost (up to 100 times higher) or running time (up to 2000 times slower).
Trajectory Data. Due to legal hurdles we could not obtain actual user trajectory data from LBS providers, but we were able to resort to the Brinkhoff generator [14] to generate the trajectory data for our experiments. The Brinkhoff generator has been widely used to generate moving object data for studies in various fields, including location-based services and beyond. It takes as input the road network of a metro area and generates trajectories of various classes of moving objects that are constrained by the road network. The classes differ in number and speed with which the trajectories move relative to each other (e.g. cars, bikes, pedestrians, etc.). We generated a master data set of 2 million trajectories of length 30, with 5 different classes of moving objects, using the actual road network of the San Francisco Bay area. Then we drew random samples of increasing number of trajectories (10k, 50k, 100k etc.) of length 10 and 30.
Platform. Unless otherwise stated all our experiments run on a Linux server with an Intel Xeon Processor (2.8GHz) and 32G memory. In one experiment, we had to use a machine with Intel Pentium Core2 Duo processor (2.4Ghz) with 2 GB RAM and running Cygwin on Windows XP because the binary we got from the authors of [30] was compiled for that configuration.
Anonymity degree. In all experiments, k = 50.
Scalability
In the first set of experiments we evaluate the scalability of the Traj-anon algorithm by increasing the number of trajectories to be anonymized, from 10k to 2 million, for a fixed k=50 (we consider both trajectory length 10 and 30). As shown in Figure 9 , the algorithm scales linearly with the number of trajectories. In particular, Traj-anon anonymizes 2 million trajectories of length 30 in less than 4 min. Figure 10 breaks down the running time into a) loading the user trajectories from a file to the main memory data structures, b) obtaining the optimum configuration for the user trajectories and, c) obtaining the policy from the configuration (as expected this time is negligible, under 1%).
Related anonymization techniques
We are unaware of any competing TP-aware sender anonymity solutions. As detailed in Section 6, the previously proposed algorithms for trajectory-aware sender k-anonymity do not defend against policy-aware attackers, and as shown in Section 1 policyaware snapshot sender k-anonymizing algorithms [16] do not defend against trajectory-aware attacks. Since we couldn't find direct competitors, we created some by leveraging existing work.
As a baseline approach we decided to extend an algorithm for policy-aware snapshot sender k-anonymity to TP-aware sender kanonymity. We chose the Bulk dp algorithm in [16] since it provides the optimum anonymization for a snapshot and uses (semi-)-quadrant cloaks (just like Traj-anon).
We also considered solutions proposed for trajectory anonymity, a privacy problem orthogonal to sender anonymity. In trajectory anonymization, the goal is to anonymize user trajectories such that an attacker, who knows locations of users in certain snapshots (partial trajectories), cannot infer whether a user's trajectory passes through a particular location. Trajectory anonymity tries to hide the user's whereabouts, while sender anonymity assumes them as known and focuses instead on hiding the identity of request senders. Due to the different goals and assumptions of the two privacy guarantees, some of the data transformation techniques employed in trajectory anonymization (such as deletion of locations, addition of locations, and shifting locations from a trajectory), do not apply to sender anonymity. Despite the differences, we identified a class of trajectory anonymization solutions whose techniques can in principle be adapted to provider TP-aware sender k-anonymity. This class of solutions use some clustering algorithm to partition user trajectories into groups of k trajectories and then applies other data transformations (described above) to preserve trajectory anonymity. We realized that one can adapt the clustering techniques to obtain the bundles used in offline TP-aware sender k-anonymization. We borrowed the clustering techniques from state-of-the-art trajectory anonymization solutions [25, 30] to obtain three different competing solutions for offline TP-aware sender k-anonymity.
Next we describe these three solutions along with the baseline approach based on snapshot P-aware sender k-anonymity.
Baseline TP-aware is based on the P-aware snapshot anonymization algorithm Bulk dp described in [16] . We format the input trajectory data as a sequence of snapshots. We anonymize the first snapshot of the input trajectory data using Bulk dp and group together the trajectories whose locations in the first snapshot are anonymized to the same cloak. Since Bulk dp provides policyaware sender k-anonymity each group must have at least k members. For each group and for each snapshot, we find the smallest quadrant that masks the locations of the trajectories in the group. Thus for each group we obtain a sequence of quadrants that plays the role of a bundle in the sense of Traj-anon. This anonymization provides TP-aware sender k-anonymity since there are at least k trajectories that are anonymized to the same sequence of cloaks.
Fast Clustering is based on the fast TGA algorithm in [25] . It creates a cluster of k trajectories by first randomly selecting an unanonymized trajectory as the center of the cluster and then adding its k-1 nearest neighbor trajectories to the cluster. The distance between two trajectories is the sum of the "distances" between their locations in each snapshot and the distance between two locations is the logarithm of the area of the smallest axis-parallel minimum bounding rectangle (rectangle whose sides are parallel to the x and y axis of a 2-dimensional plane) that masks the two locations.
Slow Clustering is based on the multi TGA algorithm in [25] . To create a cluster of k trajectories, it first randomly selects an unanonymized trajectory as the center of the cluster and adds k-1 additional trajectories one by one so as to minimize the cost of the cluster. The cost of a cluster is the sum of the logarithms of areas of axis-parallel MBRs, that masks the locations of the trajectories in the cluster, in each snapshot.
Hilbert-based Clustering [30] uses an embedding of two-dimensional into one-dimensional space, associating to each location a Hilbert index which is then used to simplify the nearest-neighbor computation used to cluster trajectories. The original approach requires identification of certain locations in a trajectory as quasiidentifiers (uniquely identifying the user). Since we assume that the entire user trajectory is accessible to the attacker, every location in his trajectory is a potential quasi-identifier. Thus in the input to the Hilbert-based clustering algorithm we specify every location of a trajectory as quasi-identifiers. As a result, the distance between two trajectories is the sum of the absolute difference between the Hilbert indexes of the locations in each snapshot. Since the algorithm computes the clusters of k-1 nearest neighbors for each trajectory independently, two clusters can have some trajectories in common. Clusters with common trajectories are merged.
In the three clustering-based approaches, after computing the clusters, all trajectories in a cluster are anonymized using the sequence of axis-parallel Minimum Bounding Rectangles (MBR) (rectangles whose sides are parallel to the x and y axis) that masks each snapshot of the clustered trajectories. We compare the execution time and cost of anonymization obtained using the four algorithms described above with those of Traj-anon. To make a fair comparison, we modify the output of Traj-anon and replace the quadrants in the cloak sequence with axis-parallel MBRs ensuring that the MBR that replaces a quadrant must be included in the quadrant.
We implemented the Baseline, Fast and Slow Clustering algorithms in C++ and obtained the Hilbert-based Clustering binaries from the authors of [30] (compiled for Cygwin on Windows XP). Figure 11 shows the cost of anonymizing an increasing number of trajectories (10k, 50k, 100k, 200k,600k and 1M) of length 30, using Traj-anon and the clustering-based algorithms described above (results for length 10 are similar and not shown here; we stopped at 1M trajectories as the other algorithms did not scale).
Comparison with snapshot-based Baseline. As shown in Figure 11 the Baseline approach has the highest cost among all the anonymization algorithms. It is significantly more than Traj-anon. For 600k trajectories and more the cost of anonymization with Baseline is 100 times that of Traj-anon. This is because having optimum cost for one snapshot leads to bigger cost for other snapshots when the trajectories diverge (since the trajectories in a group must be anonymized together in all the snapshots).
Comparison with Fast Clustering. As shown in Figure 11 the cost of anonymizing trajectories using fast clustering is more than that with Traj-anon and slow clustering. The difference between the anonymization cost increases with the number of trajectories and for 1 million trajectories of length 30, the anonymization cost of fast clustering is 100 times more than that of Traj-anon. In terms of execution time, as shown in Figure 12 , the fast clustering takes significantly longer in comparison with Traj-anon. For e.g. Trajanon takes less than 1.5 min to anonymize 1 million trajectories of length 30 in comparison to 370 min by fast clustering.
Comparison with Slow Clustering. As shown in Figure 11 the cost of anonymizing trajectories using slow clustering is better than that with Traj-anon, by a factor of roughly 4: for 600K (1M) trajectories, Traj-anon obtains a cost of 20 × 10 16 (28.5 × 10 16 ), Slow clustering a cost of 5 × 10 16 (6.6 × 10 16 ). But as shown in Figure 12 Slow Clustering is the slowest of all anonymization techniques. It takes over 3 days for the slow clustering algorithm to anonymize 1 million trajectories of length 30, in comparison under .00E+00 .00E+00 .00E+00 .00E+00 .00E+00 .00E+00 .00E+00 .00E+00 .00E+00 0 200000 400000 600000 800000 1000000
Traj Figure 13 compares the anonymization cost of Hilbert-based clustering with that of Traj-anon. We could not process more than 50k trajectories because the Hilbert-based clustering implementation does not scale beyond. The cost of Hilbert-based clustering is considerably higher than Traj-anon. Even for 10k trajectories the cost of Hilbert-based clustering is 30 times higher than that of Traj-anon and, reaching 50 times for 40k trajectories. A possible reason for the higher cost of Hilbert-based clustering is the distortion introduced in mapping the 2-dimensional space to a single dimension.
As shown in Figure 14 the Hilbert-based clustering is considerably slower than Traj-anon. It takes over 11 hours to anonymize 50k trajectories of length 30 using Hilbert-based clustering in comparison to 12 sec by Traj-anon. Even though the Hilbert-based clustering uses a simpler distance function, it is slower due to the high number of comparisons to find the k nearest neighbors.
RELATED WORK
In the context of LBS, the two aspects of privacy that have received most attention are trajectory anonymity and sender anonymity.
Trajectory anonymity. As detailed in Section 5.2, the line of work on trajectory anonymity [25, 30, 28, 22] is complementary to ours: its goal is to hide the user's precise location over a period of time (one is not required to hide the identity of the user), while sender anonymity hides the identity of the user, assuming that the trajectory data falls in the attacker's hand. Even though the problem of trajectory anonymity is orthogonal to the problem studied in this paper, as described in Section 5 a class of clustering based solutions can be adapted to provide offline TP-aware sender k-anonymity, and we have compared against them in detail.
Classes of Attackers. The solutions for sender k-anonymity in the context of location-based services can be classified into four categories based on the class of attackers they prevent against:
Policy-unaware trajectory-unaware: The solutions [19, 24, 20] in this class are also known as k-inside policies [16] as these solutions use tightest cloak (of a pre-defined shape) that includes the sender and k-1 other users. This class of solutions neither preserve privacy against a policy-aware attacker (as shown in [16] ) nor against a trajectory-aware attacker (also shown in [12, 29, 15] ).
Policy-aware trajectory-unaware: This class of solutions [11, 16] ensures that there are at least k users anonymized using the same cloak. The privacy guarantee of these solutions is strictly stronger than the policy-unaware solutions i.e. they also defend against policy-unaware trajectory-unaware attackers but not conversely (for a formal proof see [16] ). But as shown in Section 1 they fail to preserve privacy against a policy-aware attacker who is also trajectory-aware.
Policy-unaware trajectory-aware: This class of solutions [29, 18, 15, 12] targets anonymity against the trajectory-aware attackers using a sequence of cloaks that masks the user and the same k-1 users for the entire duration of the user trajectory. [15] claims policy-awareness as well, but the claim needs qualification, as it isn't clear what the attacker knows: a) the mapping from a given set of user trajectories to the sequence of cloaks, or b) the algorithm producing this mapping in addition to the mapping itself (this is our sense of policy-awareness). We claim that [15] defends against attacker class a) but not b), and thus gives a weaker guarantee than the one we target here. We illustrate how the 2-sharing property of [15] allows policy-aware attackers to breach privacy. Consider the cloaking algorithm in [15] that takes into account the requesting location to generate cloaking groups (set of locations that are cloaked to the same region). For the locations in Figure 15 , if the first request is made by C the algorithm groups C with B whereas if the first request is made by B then B and A end up in the same cloaking group to satisfy the 2-sharing property. In the case when the first anonymized request contains the cloak corresponding to {C, B}, a policy-aware attacker immediately infers that the sender is C.
Policy-aware trajectory-aware: We are unaware of any work that provides policy-aware and trajectory-aware sender k-anonymity and therefore we propose the guarantee in this paper. As illustrated in Section 1 even this privacy guarantee does not allow to completely publish the linkage between multiple requests sent by the same user. It does allow to publish the requests made along a trajectory bundle.
Trusted LBS. In the model used in this paper we assume that the LBS provider is a trusted entity and responsible for anonymizing the user requests that it collects over a period of time. We share this assumption with a line of work on trajectory anonymization [25, 30, 28, 10, 23, 22] where the location provider (who logs user trajectories) is trusted and is responsible for anonymization.
Online vs Offline. Another contrasting feature between previous trajectory-aware sender anonymity proposals and the one in this paper is the mode of anonymization. In [29, 18, 15, 12] LBS requests are anonymized as they are issued i.e. online while we anonymize the request log i.e. offline. One can possibly use the online solutions for the offline TP-aware sender anonymization but with a necessarily sub-optimal cost since the future movement of the users is not known by the online anonymizer. The cloak that masks a group of k users can become arbitrarily large if their trajectories diverge.
Beyond sender k-anonymity: l-diversity. In the setting of relational table anonymization, k-anonymity is viewed as a classical baseline, recently subsumed by stronger guarantees ranging from l-diversity [21] to differential privacy. For the LBS context, this raises the natural question of analogous guarantees that subsume sender k-anonymity. We note that LBS sender privacy is a much younger field, in which even such a fundamental guarantee as sender k-anonymity (especially in its TP-aware form) hadn't been solved until now. We also note that in an LBS context, sender k-anomymity is not weaker than sender l-diversity, actually coinciding with it. To see why, consider an analogy to the "homogeneity attack" that breaks classical k-anoymity but is foiled by l-diversity [21] : there is a possibility that all user histories masked by a bundle send identical requests in a particular snapshot (possibly from different locations). But since a bundle associates a set of requests (no duplicates) with a cloak, all the identical requests are represented by a single request, thus precluding the homogeneity attack, and in fact any attack based on the distribution of request values.
CONCLUSIONS
We introduce and study the problem of offline trajectory-and policyaware sender k-anonymity. We show that prior results for snapshot k-anonymity do not apply and that trajectory-awareness leads to strictly stronger attackers, calling for a stronger privacy guarantee.
APPENDIX
A. PROOFS A.1 Lemma 1 PROOF. (a) Let U be a set of n trajectories and policies P1 and P2 are equivalent for anonymizing U w.r.t. a G-tree T . We describe the cost of anonymizing U using P1 as:
where mi = P1(U, ui) ∈ T for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Note, for i = j, mi and mj can be the same node in T . Similarly we describe the cost of anonymizing U using P2 as:
where m i = P2(U, ui) ∈ T for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Note, for i = j, m i and m j can be the same node in T . Since P1 and P2 are equivalent, if a node m ∈ T is used by P1 to anonymize x trajectories in U then m is also used by P2 to anonymize the same number of trajectories in U . Therefore,
because each quadrant appears same number of times on both sides of Equation 1. Hence we have:
(b) Suppose P1 provide T P -aware sender k-anonymity to U w.r.t. T . Therefore, for each node m ∈ T , P1 either anonymizes none or at least k trajectories using m. We are given that P1 and P2 are equivalent for T , therefore they both anonymize the same number of trajectories using m. Therefore, P2 either anonymizes none or at least k trajectories using m. Thus, P2 also provides T P -aware sender k-anonymity to U w.r.t. T . Similarly we can show that if P2 provides T P -aware sender k-aonymity to U , so does P1.
A.2 Lemma 2
PROOF. Let U be a set of trajectories and T be a G-tree of quadcloak sequences. Let P be a policy that uses the cloak sequences from T and C be the configuration representing the class of policies equivalent to P .
First we assume that P provides TP-aware sender k-anonymity and show that C is k-summing configuration. Since P is TP-aware sender k-anonymous, each quad-cloak sequence in T is used in P to anonymize either none or at least k trajectories. Thus • For an internal node m ∈ T , let ∆ = l i=1 C(mi), where m1 . . . m l are the children of m in T (iii) if ∆ < k then there are less than k trajectories passed up by children of m. Thus P cannot anonymize any trajectory using m and therefore we have C(m) = ∆. (iv) if ∆ ≥ k then the children of m passes up at least k trajectories. Therefore, P could either anonymize at least k trajectories or no trajectory using m. In former case C(m) ≤ (∆ − k) while in later case C(m) = ∆.
Thus C satisfies k-summing property. Next we assume that C is k-summing configuration and show that P provides TP-aware sender k-anonymity to U . Equivalently we show that under C, each cloak of T is used to anonymize either none or at least k trajectories. Since C is a k-summing configuration, it implies that:
anonymize any trajectory using m.
In the later case P anonymizes at least k trajectory using m, while in former case none trajectory at all.
• for an internal node m ∈ T let ∆ = l i=1 C(mi), where m1 . . . m l are the children of m in T (iii) if ∆ < k, then C(m) = ∆. Thus P does not anonymize any trajectory using m.
In the later case P anonymizes at least k trajectories using m, while in former case none trajectories.
Therefore P provides TP-aware sender k-anonymity.
A.3 Lemma 3
PROOF. The intuition behind Lemma 3 is that Traj-anon algorithm exhausts the search space of all potential optimal k-summing configurations by utilizing Property 2. To prove it formally, we use structural induction to show that for each node m in the G-tree T and an integer l such that l ≤ d(m), we have
where cost alg (m, l) represents the cost computed by Trajanon for passing up l (unanonymized) trajectories at m and costmin(cset(m, l)) represents minimum cost of passing up l trajectories at m among all such k-summing configurations.
Basis: For a leaf node m and an integer l ≤ d(m), it is obvious by construction that cost alg (m, l) = costmin(cset(m, l)).
Induction: Let m be a non-leaf node in the G-tree T and m1, m2, · · · m f be the children of m. Let l be an integer such that l ≤ d(m) and cset(m, l) be the set of k-summing configuration that passes up l (unanonymized) trajectories at node m. We show that for each configuration g ∈ cset(m, l), cost alg (m, l) ≤ cost(g(m)), where cost(g(m)) represents the cost of g at node m. If g(m1) = l1, g(m2) = l2, · · · and g(m f ) = l f , the cost of m in g can be written as
By induction hypothesis we assume that cost alg (m1, l1) ≤ cost(g(m1)), and similarly cost alg (m2, l2) ≤ cost(g(m2)), · · · ,
And by adding the constant value cost(m)×(l1+l2+· · ·+l f −l) to both the sides we get
Similarly, for each node m and each integer l ≤ d(m), and each configuration g ∈ cset(m, l), we can show that cost alg (m, l) ≤ cost(g(m)). Therefore cost alg (m, l) = costmin(cset(m, l)).
A.4 Lemma 4
PROOF. We describe the cost of anonymizing the set U of n trajectories using policy P as:
where mi = P (U, ui) ∈ T for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since, for i = j, mi and mj can be the same node in T , we can rewrite the above equation as follows:
where f (m, P ) is the number of trajectories anonymized by P using cloak sequence m. Since C represents the equivalence class of P ,
where f (m, C) is as defined in Definition 4. Therefore the cost of configuration C of T can be written as:
A.5 Lemma 5 PROOF. First we give the intuion of this proof. Let Cu be the optimum k-summing configuration for Tu. Notice that every node in Tu is also a node in the corresponding Tusq. Therefore Cu is a valid but not necessarily optimal k-summing configuration for Tusq. Consequently, the cost of the optimum k-summing configuration for Tusq is not more than the cost of Cu.
To prove it formally, we can define a configuration C for Tusq as follows PROOF. We prove this by reducing the problem of optimum kanonymization of relational tables on binary alphabet, shown to be NP-hard in [26, 13] , to the optimum offline TP-aware sender k-anonymity with quad-cloaks.
We first briefly describe the problem of optimum k-anonymization of relational tables on binary alphabet with suppression. Let T be a relational table with m columns where each tuple contains data corresponding to a unique user. The tuples of T can be considered to be m-dimensional vectors vi drawn from Σ m , where Σ = {0, 1}. Thus T can also be represented as a subset T ⊆ Σ m . Let be a fresh symbol not in Σ. Suppression is defined as follows:
m . We say f is a a suppressor of T if for all t ∈ T and j = 1, . . . , m it is the case that
Inuitively, a suppressor function replaces the values of certain attributes in certain tuples with . The idea behind a suppressor function is that by replacing values of certain attributes in a set of tuples with , it can make all of them identical such that an attacker cannot associate a tuple in that set to the actual user. This is formalized in the following definition. DEFINITION 7 (k-Anonymity). Let T be a relational table and f a suppressor function. The anonymized table f (T ) is said to be k-anonymous if for any t ∈ T , there exist k distinct vectors in
Since there can be many possible suppressor functions, the goal is to find one that minimizes the number of suppressed values i.e. number of * in the anonymized table. The problem of optimum k-anonymization of relational tables on binary alphabets is defined as follows. DEFINITION 8 (Optimum k-anonymity). Given a relational table T ⊆ Σ m , and a positive integer c ∈ N, is there a suppressor f such that f (T ) is k-anonymous, and the total number of vector coordinates suppressed in f (T ) is at most c?
For ease of presentation we use k=3 and reduce the optimum 3-anonymity of relational table on binary alphabet to optimum offline TP-aware sender 3-anonymity. This particular relational problem we reduce from is proved NP-hard in [26, 13] . Given a relational table T with n m-dimensional tuples over binary alphabet {0, 1}, we create a set of n user-history objects with trajectories of length m. For each tuple ti, we create a user-history object ui and set the location at the j-th snapshot of the trajectory as Table   • (i, i) if the j-th column in ti has the value 0.
• (nr + i, i) otherwise, where r = 2 lg √ 2mn .
We construct a quad-tree Q such that the root node represents the square region (0, 0) (left-bottom coordinates) to (2nr, 2nr) (right-top coordinates) as shown in Figure 16 . The root quadrant is divided into 4 equal square sub-quadrants. We show that the cost of the optimal 3-ANONYMITY solution for T is at most c if and only if the cost of the optimum policy that provides TP-aware sender k-anonymity to the set of users U constructed above is at most (4c + 1)n 2 r 2 . Suppose that there is a solution that finds the optimum quadcloak policy P of cost at most (4c + 1)n 2 r 2 . We construct a suppressor f that k-anonymizes T as follows. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n and any 1 ≤ j ≤ m, if the j-th location in the trajectory of ui is masked by the root node of Q in the cloak sequence used to anonymize ui, then f (ti)[j] = and f (ti)[j] = ti[j] otherwise. Given the upper bound on the cost of the policy there can be at most c such locations in the trajectories of the users objects that are masked by the root node of Q in the cloak sequences used to anonymize them. Therefore the cost of f is at most c. Moreover, since P preserves sender 3-anonymity, there must be 3 trajectories that are anonymized to the same cloak sequence and by construction these 3 trajectories will be anonymized the same way by the suppressor f and hence f is 3-anonymous.
Next let assume f is a suppressor that provides 3-anonymity to T and whose cost is at most c. Using f we define a quad-cloak policy P for the set U of user-history objects constructed above. Policy P assigns a quadrant to the j-th position of user trajectory Ti by looking up the value of f (Ti)[j]:
• If f (Ti)[j] = , then P uses the biggest quadrant (0, 0) to (nr, nr).
• If f (Ti)[j] = 0, then P uses a cloak sequence with the quadrant (0, 0) to (n, n) at the j th position to anonymize user ui.
• If f (Ti)[j] = 1, then P uses a cloak sequence with the quadrant (nr, 0) to (nr + n, n) at the j th position to anonymize user ui.
P is a valid policy as every cloak used masks the corresponding location. For any two tuples ta and t b , f (ta) = f (t b ) implies that P uses the same cloak sequence to anonymize users-history objects ua and u b . Given that f provides 3-anonymity to T there must be 3 users that are anonymized using the same cloak sequence hence P provides TP-aware 3-anonymity to the set of users U . Furthermore, since the cost of f is at most c, there are at most c suppressions and hence at most c locations in the trajectories of the users in U are anonymized by P to the root node of Q. The sum of the area of these cloaks is at most 4cn 2 r 2 . The remaining locations in the trajectories of users of U are anonymized using cloaks of size n 2 . Since there are at most mn such locations, the total cost of P is 4cn 2 r 2 + mn 3 ≤ 4cn 2 r 2 + 2mn 3 ≤ (4c + 1)n 2 r 2 .
A.8 Theorem 2 q 1 q 2 q x q l -1 q l … … size = R size ≤ R size ≤ R size ≤ R size ≤ R Figure 17 : Quad-cloak policy P q 1 q 2 q x q l -1 q l … … size = R size = R size = R size = R size = R Figure 18 : Uniform quad-cloak policy P PROOF. We prove this theorem by showing that any quad-cloak policy P that provides TP-aware sender k-anonymity can be transformed to a uniform quad-cloak policy P that provides the same TP-aware sender k-anonymity guarantee, and for every input trajectory u, its corresponding cloak sequence by P (u) has a cost that is at most l times the cost of cloak sequence by P (u).
The policy P is constructed as follows. For each user trajectory u, let the cloak sequence of P (u) be s = q1, q2, · · · , q l as shown in Figure 17 . Let R be the size of the biggest cloak in s. Now to construct P , we "expand" each qi in s to size R as shown in Figure 18 . More specifically, let fR(x) be the lowest ancestor of x or x itself that has size R. Then P will anonymize u using sequence of cloaks s = fR(q1), fR(q2), · · · , fR(q l ) . In this way, the cost of cloak sequence s is l × R, which is less than l × cost(s). It then follows that the overall cost of P is at most l times the overall cost of P .
The constructed P also provides TP-aware sender k-anonymity since all trajectories that were anonymized to the same cloak sequence by P will now be anonymized to the same cloak sequence by P . Finally, since the above results apply to any quad-cloak policy, they apply to the optimum quad-cloak policy Popt as well. That is, there exists a uniform quad-cloak policy, which is not necessarily the optimum among all uniform quad-cloak policies, that has a cost at most l times the cost of Popt. Consequently, the cost of the optimal uniform quad-cloak policy is bounded by l times the cost of Popt as well.
A.9 Theorem 3
PROOF. Let U be a set of trajectories. Lemma 3 shows that Traj-anon computes optimum uniform quad-tree policy for anonymizing U . According to Theorem 2 this optimum solution is lapproximation of the optimum quad-tree policy for anonymizing U . Therefore, Traj-anon computes the l-approximation solution to the problem of optimum TP-aware sender k-anonymity using quad cloaks.
A.10 Theorem 4
PROOF. We prove this by reducing the decision version of optimum policy-aware snapshot k-anonymization with circular cloaks to the decision version optimum offline TP-aware k-anonymization with circular cloaks. First we briefly describe the problem of policyaware snapshot k-anonymization with circular cloaks.
Let D be an instance of location database with schema S = {userid, locx, locy} and SC be a set of points in 2-dimensional space. A snapshot policy with circular cloaks is defined as a deterministic function that maps locations in D to circular cloaks, each centered at some point from SC, with no restriction on radius. The cost of a snapshot policy with circular cloaks is computed as:
Costs(P, D) = l∈D Cost(P (D, l)) where the cost of the cloak P (D, l) is the area of circular cloak.
DEFINITION 9 (Snapshot k-anonymity with circular cloaks).
Given an instance D of location database and SR be the set of points in 2-dimensional space. Is there a snapshot policy P with circular cloaks that provides policy-aware sender k-anonymity and whose Costs(P, D) ≤ C.
We reduce an instance I of the above problem to an instance I of the optimum offline TP-aware sender k-anonymity with circular cloaks. For each tuple t ∈ D, we create an user-history object u with trajectory of length 1 and set u.userid() = t.userid and u.location(1) = (t.locx, t.locy). Let the resulting set of userhistory objects be U . We create an instance I of optimum offline TP-aware k-anonymization with circular cloaks using U and SR. We prove that there is snapshot policy P with circular cloaks that provides policy-aware snapshot sender k-anonymity w.r.t. D and Costs(P, D) ≤ C, if and only if there is an anonymization policy Pt that provides T P -aware sender k-anonymity solution w.r.t. U and Cost(Pt, U ) ≤ C.
Let Pt be an offline policy that uses circular cloaks and provides TP-aware sender k-anonymity to the set U of user-history objects (constructed above). Let the cost of Pt be Cost(Pt, U ) ≤ U . Since the user-objects in U are of length 1, the bundles obtained with Pt are also of length 1. We use Pt to obtain a snapshot policy Ps for D as follows. For each tuple t ∈ D, we define Ps(D, (t.locx, t.locy)) = b.cloak(1) where b = Pt(U, u) for the user-history object u such that u.userid() = t.userid. Since Pt provides TP-aware sender k-anonymity, there exists at least k userhistory objects that are anonymized to a bundle b. Therefore the policy Ps as defined above also anonymizes at least k locations to the circular cloak in bundle b. Hence Ps provides policy-aware snapshot k-anonymity. Moreover, since Cost(Pt, U ) ≤ C and Cost(Pt, U ) = Costs(Ps, D), therefore Costs(Ps, D) ≤ C.
Suppose there exists an snapshot policy Ps with circular cloaks that provides policy-aware sender k-anonymity to D and whose cost Costs(Ps, D) ≤ C. We use Ps to obtain a policy Pt as follows. For every user-history object u ∈ U corresponding to the tuple t ∈ D such that u.userid() = t.userid, we define Pt(U, u) = b where b is a bundle of length 1 and b.cloak(1) = Ps(D, (t.locx, t.locy)). Since Ps provides policy-aware snapshot sender k-anonymity, there exists at least k locations that are aonymized to the same cloak. Therefore there are at least k user-history objects that are anonymized to the same bundle and Pt is TP-aware sender k-anonymous. Moreover, since the Costs(Ps, D) ≤ C, and Cost(Pt, U ) = Costs(Ps, D), therefore Cost(Pt, U ) ≤ C.
